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Abstract 
A key technique associated with effective cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is the 
behavioral experiment (BE). Within mainstream clinical psychology, the overall aim of the 
BE is to treat clients’ problematic beliefs as a set of hypotheses to be tested. In this review, I 
examine the BE as a treatment technique and argue that widespread implementation of the 
BE could significantly improve CBT-based forensic psychological practice. I examine 
contemporary conceptualizations of cognition within forensic psychology as well as 
commonly used treatment techniques for instilling cognitive change. This analysis highlights 
that although some experiential techniques are used in forensic psychology to facilitate 
cognitive change (e.g., schema therapy), there is still a key focus on rational reasoning 
techniques such as Socratic questioning, psychoeducation, and thought monitoring. In this 
paper, I argue that current methods of instigating cognitive change within offending 
populations neglect key strategies necessary to generate convincing cognitive change. I offer 
the BE as a convincing and effective technique for facilitating change in problematic offender 
cognition at both the rational and experiential level. I offer several recommendations for how 
to design and incorporate BEs into forensic practice and provide examples of BE use in 
forensic settings.  
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Forensic Psychologists Should use the Behavioral Experiment in to Facilitate Cognitive 
Change in Clients who have Offended 
Forensic psychologists tasked with rehabilitating offenders hold a difficult and often 
unenviable role. Every forensic psychologist has come across clients who hold highly 
problematic beliefs about themselves, crime, violence, or their victims that appear impervious 
to change. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) is the effective treatment method of choice 
for those aiming to adapt such cognitions (Hall, 1995; Hanson et al., 2002; Landenberger & 
Lipsey, 2005; Pearson, Lipton, Cleland, & Yee, 2002). Yet many CBT techniques imported 
from mainstream clinical psychology by forensic psychologists (e.g., thought monitoring) fail 
to adequately convince the client to change their beliefs. Put simply, clients sincerely believe 
in the validity of their problematic cognitions meaning that even sophisticated and rational 
consideration of alternative prosocial cognitions is unlikely to instigate genuine cognitive 
change (Marshall et al., 2011; Pfäfflin et al., 2005). In mainstream clinical psychology, 
however, CBT psychologists dealing with some of the most highly entrenched and 
problematic cognitions implement an effective technique for facilitating adaptive cognitive 
change that is little used by forensic psychologists: that of the Behavioral Experiment (BE). 
In short, BEs may be defined as: 
…planned experiential activities, based on experimentation or observation, which are 
designed by patients in or between cognitive therapy sessions. Their design is derived 
directly from a cognitive formulation of the problem, and their primary purpose is to 
obtain new information which may help to: 
 test the validity of the patients’ existing beliefs about themselves, others, and 
the world 
 construct and/or test new, more adaptive beliefs… 
 (Bennett-Levy et al., 2004, p. 8) 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 4 
 In other words, the overall aim of the BE is to treat the client’s problematic beliefs as 
a set of hypotheses to be tested. Using Bennett-Levy et al.’s definition—which has been 
widely accepted by professionals (Farmer & Chapman, 2008)—I will argue that there is a 
strong need for those working with offenders to use the BE as an effective technique for 
instilling cognitive change. First, however, I will examine contemporary conceptualizations 
of cognition within forensic psychology as well as current techniques used to instill cognitive 
change. Following this, I will examine the BE as a general treatment technique within 
mainstream clinical psychology and examine how the BE could significantly improve CBT-
based forensic practice. In order to increase the clarity and focus of this paper, I will use the 
term cognition(s) to refer to, “structure of mental knowledge and … associated thoughts, 
perceptions, understanding and reasoning” (Gannon & Wood, 2007, p.71). In line with 
Fishbone and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action I will use the term belief to refer to 
basic knowledge that an individual holds about a situation, object, or set of circumstances and 
the term attitude to refer to cognition holding a strong affective element (e.g., sentiments and 
values). Underlying all of these terms is the assumption that cognition—in the form of beliefs 
and attitudes—plays a key role in influencing behavior. As such, I will append the term 
‘offense-supportive’ to describe cognition that appears to facilitate or maintain offending 
behavior. In this paper the term forensic psychologist will be used to refer to individuals who 
are trained and registered to conduct independent psychological practice in correctional or 
prison settings as well as mental health facilities. Finally, unless otherwise stated, I focus my 
discussions on offending committed by adult males since the majority of research examining 
offense-supportive cognition has been conducted with this group. However, many of the 
concepts and techniques will apply equally to juvenile and female offender populations.  
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Conceptualization of Cognition within Forensic Psychology 
 Over the past three decades the concept of cognition has gradually been used to help 
explain the facilitation and maintenance of a variety of offending behaviors (Abel et al., 
1984; Gilchrist, 2009; Ó Ciara & Gannon, 2010; Polaschek, Calvert, & Gannon, 2008; 
Polaschek & Gannon, 2004; Ward & Keenan, 1999). However, unlike the concept of 
cognition within clinical psychology, early cognitive explanations of offending—in particular 
sexual offending—were subject to widespread conceptual problems (see Gannon & 
Polaschek, 2006; Maruna & Copes, 2005). This may have stemmed from the fact that 
offenders minimize and defend their offending behavior (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006). 
Consequently, minimizations and externalizations were easily mislabeled as more 
longstanding cognitions. Recent research, however, has indicated that externalizing one’s 
behavior (e.g., ‘It just happened’) or citing transitory reasons for one’s behavior (e.g., ‘I was 
high on drugs’) does not increase future offending risk (Dean et al., 2007; Marshall, 
Marshall, Serran, & O’Brien, 2011; Maruna, 2001; Maruna & Mann, 2006).  
Over the past decade, a healthy focus has ensued in most areas of offender cognition. 
Researchers across all offending behaviors have now identified many of the longstanding and 
pervasive cognitions that facilitate and maintain offending (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; 
Maruna & Mann, 2006; Ó Ciardha & Gannon, 2010; Polaschek, Calvert, & Gannon, 2009). 
This has enabled researchers to more clearly pinpoint etiological cognitions likely to require 
modification in treatment (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Graham & Van Dieten, 1999; Hanson & 
Morton-Bourgon, 2004; Helmus, Hanson, Babchishin, & Mann, 2012; Mills, Kroner, & 
Hemmati, 2004; Simourd, & Olver, 2002; Simourd & Van De Ven, 1999). Below, I outline 
the key cognitions identified as important targets for treatment as suggested by empirical 
research and theory. I use the risk need responsivity model (RNR; Andrews & Bonta, 
2010)—widely regarded as the “orthodox position concerning rehabilitation” (Ward, Collie, 
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& Bourke, 2009, p.299) and the strengths-based Good Lives Model (Ward & Gannon, 2006) 
to frame important aspects of offender cognition. Within the RNR three key principles are 
specified as being required to optimize treatment effectiveness. First, treatment program 
intensity should be matched to the risk of the offender. Second, treatment should focus on 
criminogenic needs associated with reductions in recidivism. Related to this, Good Lives 
Model proponents have proposed that both criminogenic and ‘non criminogenic’ cognitions 
should also be targeted in treatment if—like criminogenic needs—they appear to block the 
client’s ability to lead a pro-social and meaningful life (Marshall et al., 2011; Willis, Yates, 
Gannon, & Ward, 2013). Finally, the third principle states that treatment should attend to 
issues of internal responsivity (i.e., aspects about the offender such as mental health problems 
or low self esteem that may potentially block treatment commitment or key benefits obtained 
from treatment).  
Cognitions Indicative of Risk/Criminogenic Need 
Longstanding cognitions in the form of offense-supportive attitudes and beliefs have 
been identified as key for predicting offending and repeat offending (Andrews & Bonta, 
2010; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005; Hanson & Scott, 1995; Helmus et al., 2013; Mills, 
Kroner, & Hemmati, 2004; Simourd & Olver, 2007; Simourd & Van De Ven, 1999; 
Thornton, 2002). Research with sexual offenders shows that a high level of emotional 
identification with children or attitudes that sex with children is undamaging or even 
desirable elevates risk and requires treatment prioritization (Dean et al., 2007; Hanson, 2006; 
Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005; Helmus et al., 2013; Marshall, Marshall, Serran, & 
O’Brien, 2011). Similarly, attitudes indicating general antisocialism, hostile perceptions of 
women, sexual entitlement, and viewing women as untrustworthy are all areas of offense-
supportive cognition that increase risk of sexual reoffending (Hanson & Harris, 2000; 
Langton, 2007; Marshall et al., 2011). For non-sexual offenders research shows that attitudes 
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indicating identification with criminal associates, dismissal of law and convention, antisocial 
intentions, and entitlement play a key role in various offending behaviors (Andrews & Bonta, 
2010; Mills, Kroner, & Hemmati, 2004; Simourd, 1997; Simourd & Olver, 2002; Simourd & 
Van de Van, 1999). Furthermore, tolerating or normalizing violence, identifying with other 
criminals, antisocial intentions, viewing oneself as being entitled to administer ‘justice’, or 
viewing other males as potentially violent, have all been linked to violent offending (Mills et 
al., 2004; Polaschek et al., 2009). 
Cognitions Blocking a Prosocial ‘Good’ Life and/ or Responsivity to Treatment 
 There is likely to be significant overlap between cognitions that block an individual’s 
ability to lead a satisfying prosocial life and those that impact upon a client’s ability to 
connect with and respond to treatment (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Looman & Abracen, 2013; 
Ward & Gannon, 2006). For example, problematic cognitions relating to self esteem (e.g., “I 
am disliked by other people”, “I fail at everything I do”) will influence an individual’s ability 
to gain and maintain a satisfactory relationship (a criminogenic need; Andrews & Bonta, 
2010; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005; Mann, Hanson, & Thornton, 2010) and also impede 
an individual’s ability to engage in treatment through forming a cohesive bond with group 
members. A variety of cognitions can impact upon life quality and/ or responsivity to 
treatment including those relating to trauma (Clark, Tyler, Gannon, & Kingham, 2014; Gray 
et al., 2003; Latessa, Johnson, Listwan, & Koetzie, 2014; Looman & Abracen, 2013), mental 
illness (e.g., psychoses, anxiety disorders, clinical depression; Latessa et al., 2014; Looman & 
Abracen, 2013), shame and associated low self-esteem (Marshall et al., 2011; Marshall et al., 
1999), motivation (Latessa et al., 2014; Yates, 2009), and mistrust of professionals (Gannon 
& Ward, 2014). Such issues may exacerbate criminogenic needs associated with offending 
behavior (e.g., self management, inappropriate sexual arousal, problems establishing 
intimacy, Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005) and increase treatment 
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drop out (see Table 1 for examples of cognitions falling into this area). Research suggests 
that offenders who fail to connect with, and drop out of treatment, are highly likely to 
recidivate (Marques et al., 2000; Porporino, 2010). Thus, even the best treatment will fail if 
such factors, and the cognitions supporting them, are not addressed adequately prior to, or as 
part of treatment (Kennedy, 2000). As such, these cognitions may ultimately be viewed as 
offense-supportive. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Current Techniques for Adapting Offense-Supportive Cognition 
A plethora of publications are available for forensic professionals who wish to learn 
contemporary methods of adapting cognition. The focus has generally been on the adaptation 
of cognitions indicative of risk or criminogenic need (although see Marshall et al, 2011 for an 
exception). Here, CBT based cognitive restructuring is generally viewed as gold standard 
(Murphy, 1990; Marshall et al., 2011). As an overarching term, cognitive restructuring refers 
to the general technique of collaboratively guiding clients to:  identify the existence and 
operation of offense-supportive cognition, assess the origins and usefulness of such 
cognition, and generate replacement alternative cognitions (Briggs & Kennington, 2006; 
Murphy, 1990; Langton & Marshall, 2000; Rugge & Bonta, 2014). Bennett-Levy et al. 
(2004) argue that theories such as the Interacting Cognitive Systems Model (Teasdale, 1997; 
Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) and the Cognitive–Experiential Self-Theory (Epstein, 1994; 
Epstein & Pacini, 1999) highlight two distinct information processing systems: that of the 
logical and rational verbal system associated with propositional processing, and that of the 
emotional, non-verbal, and holistic system associated with implicational processing. Verbal 
cognitive restructuring impacts upon beliefs at the intellectual or propositional level whereas 
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experiential cognitive restructuring facilitates genuine belief changes at the deepest 
implicational or schematic level (see Bennett-Levy et al., 2004).  
The cognitive restructuring techniques utilized and published by forensic 
psychologists are imported from general clinical psychology and include rational reasoning 
techniques such as Socratic questioning, psychoeducation, thought records, pros and cons 
analyses (i.e., propositional level processing; Dean et al., 2007; Marshall et al., 2011: Kroner 
& Morgan, 2014; Seeler, Freeman, DiGiuseppe, & Mitchell, 2014) as well as therapeutic 
approaches and techniques aimed at the deep experiential level such as role play, behavioral 
rehearsal (i.e., implicational level processing; Dean et al., 2007; Mann & Shingler, 2006; 
Marshall et al., 2011; Ross & Ross, 1995; Walters, 2014), and schema therapy (Drake, Ward, 
Nathan, & Lee, 2001; Keulen-de Vos, Bernstein, & Arntz, 2014; Mann & Shingler, 2006). 
Below, I briefly outline each of these key therapeutic approaches and strategies.  
Rational Techniques: Propositional Processing 
Socratic Questioning 
The Socratic questioning style stems from cognitive therapy (see Beck, Rush, Shaw, 
& Emery, 1979). It refers to questioning intended to promote intellectual analyses of 
problematic thinking styles through encouraging clients to introspect on the validity of deeply 
held beliefs and attitudes (Dean et al., 2007; Overholser, 1993). Socratic questions might 
include, “What other reasons could explain why your probation officer asked you to leave her 
office?”, or “For what other reasons might your victim have looked/stared at you?”  Here, 
Socratic questioning is used as a form of guided discovery in which the overall aim is for the 
client to generate their own alternative cognitive perspectives (Dean et al., 2007; Tong & 
Farrington, 2008; Ware & Bright, 2008). In other words, it is up to the client to generate their 
own cognitive change based upon their own cognitive discoveries and reflections.  
Education 
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 Many treatment providers, to a large extent, provide offending clients with alternative 
cognitive perspectives in the form of psychoeducation, witness or victim statements, videos, 
or special guest speakers (Drake et al., 2001; Gannon, 2014). For example, a group on 
firesetting behavior may invite local fire safety officers to attend the group to provide 
alternative perspectives on the controllability and harmfulness of fire (see Gannon et al., 
2015), a therapist may offer education on why laws regarding consent are important 
(McGrath, Cumming, Burchard, Zeoli, & Ellerby, 2009), or individuals with previous 
experience of sexual abuse or violence may be invited to group to share offense impact 
information from their perspective (see Briggs & Kennington, 2006).  
Thought Records 
 Most forensic programs incorporate some type of thought recording or monitoring 
activity when aiming to instigate cognitive change (see Apsche, Evile, & Murphy, 2004; 
Briggs & Kennington, 2006; Gannon et al., 2015; Hollin & Palmer, 2006; Morin & 
Levenson, 2002; Tafrate & Mitchell, 2014).  Typically, thought recording involves the 
offender documenting problematic or offense-supportive beliefs and attitudes either within 
group work or independently outside of group work. The offending client is typically asked 
to analyze the situation to examine possible evidence for and against their viewpoint and to 
generate alternative perspectives wherever possible. In other words, clients are encouraged to 
use their thought records as a tool with which to rationally restructure their own problematic 
attitudes. To illustrate, Seeler et al. (2014) provide practitioners with a series of worksheets 
aimed at encouraging antisocial offenders to study their thought patterns and modify these 
appropriately. One of these worksheets requests clients to (1) reflect upon any problematic 
thinking they have experienced, (2) describe their key thought(s), (3) generate evidence to 
counter the thought(s), and (4) generate a statement logically consistent with (3) that 
represents a more accurate substitute thought. Not only do thought records highlight the 
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situations in which problematic thoughts are most likely to occur but they also represent a 
key stepping stone towards recognizing alternative perspectives and thus challenging the 
client’s current perception of their surrounding world. In some variants, thought records may 
be used to generate a logical cost/benefit or pros and cons analysis of deeply held problematic 
beliefs and attitudes versus substitute alternatives. 
Non-Rational Experiential Techniques: Implicational Processing 
Role Play and Behavioral Rehearsal 
 Numerous authors have highlighted role-play as representing an effective experiential 
method for instigating cognitive change in offending clients (Bishop, 2014; Dean et al., 2007; 
Gannon et al., 2010; Mann, Daniels, & Marshall, 2002; Marshall et al., 2011; Stinson & 
Becker, 2013). Within role-play, clients are encouraged to experience differing viewpoints as 
well as ‘try out’ or behaviorally rehearse new ways of thinking and behaving (Bishop, 2014; 
Marshall et al., 2011). Various role-play techniques may be adopted by therapists according 
to the nature of the client group or individual in question. A common approach for instigating 
cognitive change revolves around requesting the client to write a hypothetical letter to their 
victim (Beckett, 1994; Gannon et al., 2011) or switch between playing themselves and their 
victim in a dual person role play (Mann et al., 2002; Stinson & Becker, 2013; Webster, 
Bowers, Mann, & Marshall, 2002). It can also be helpful to ask offending clients to act as 
‘self’ and ‘other’ in new hypothetical interactions in order to aid them to understand how 
their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors may be experienced by others.  
Schema Therapy 
In recent years, schema therapy has begun to permeate forensic psychology to varying 
degrees. Within general clinical psychology, schema therapy is deemed distinct from CBT 
since it focuses on (a) the development of schema and associated problems, (b) addressing 
problems in the relationship between client and therapist as a result of problematic schema, 
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and (c) the implementation of experiential strategies to enable clients to engage with their 
schema-induced emotions and produce long-lasting cognitive change (Keulen-de Vos, 
Bernstein, & Arntz, 2014; Rafaeli, Bernstein, & Young, 2011). Schema therapy—as a 
therapeutic model and technique—requires considerable clinical skill and training (Dean et 
al., 2007). Consequently, the degree to which schema therapy has been conceptualized and 
implemented within specialist forensic fields has been highly variable. Some forensic 
professionals have conceptualized offenders’ offense-supportive criminogenic cognition as 
stemming from overarching schemas rather than disconnected and separate beliefs and 
attitudes (Drake et al., 2001; Ward, 2000; Ward & Keenan, 1999).  
However, there has been little emphasis on how schema therapy might relate to 
cognitions impeding the client’s ability to lead a pro-social life and/or relate to treatment 
responsivity. Furthermore, descriptions of how treatment might proceed using schema 
therapy are typically brief; involving rational questioning, role-play, and basic self 
observation (Dean et al., 2007; Drake et al., 2001). In their description of schema therapy for 
child sexual offenders, Dean et al., briefly cite the BE as being a powerful technique for 
instigating change. However, no further information is provided. Furthermore, in a 
particularly sophisticated and recent example of schema therapy applied to aggressive and 
personality disordered clients, Keulen-de Vos et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of 
formulating each client’s case in terms of Young’s schema theory (Young, Klosko, & 
Weishaar, 2003) and propose the existence of several ‘forensic schema modes’ to account for 
antisocial and aggressive behavior. Keulen-de Vos note the importance of using longstanding 
CBT techniques (e.g., schema or thought diaries) to highlight thinking patterns but accentuate 
experiential methods such as chair-work and role play (to experience and highlight different 
schema modes) or imagery rescripting (to cognitively rescript the outcomes of previously 
problematic situations) as being the gold standard for establishing genuine cognitive change. 
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Although BEs are not specifically mentioned, presumably they would represent one key 
experiential technique for establishing cognitive change.  
Effectiveness of Treating Offense-Supportive Cognition  
There is little specific evidence within the forensic domain that current techniques for 
instigating cognitive change—such as cognitive restructuring or schema therapy—are having 
the desired effects (Gannon & Polaschek, 2006; Marshall et al., 1999; Marshall et al., 2011). 
However, numerous studies show that specialized CBT leads to reductions in attitudes 
supporting child sexual offending behavior (Beech et al., 1998; Bumby, 1996; Watson & 
Stermac, 1994) and antisocial attitudes supporting a range of offending behaviors (e.g., 
Cullen, Clarke, Kuipers, Hodgins, Dean, & Fahy, 2012; Gannon et al., 2014; Valliant & 
Antonowicz, 1991; Yessine & Kroner, 2004). Nevertheless, while reductions in offense-
supportive attitudes reported across these studies are positive, associated effect sizes are 
generally modest suggesting that reductions in offense-supportive cognition could be further 
improved (see Beech et al., 1998 for one exception).  
In recent years, forensic professionals have noted that a rational consideration of 
alternative and prosocial cognition may not be enough to instigate genuine cognitive change 
(Marshall et al., 2011; Pfäfflin, Böhmer, Cornehl, & Mergenthaler 2005) and that therapists 
need to put much more emphasis on the behavioral elements of CBT (Fernandez, Shingler, & 
Marshall, 2006). Within forensic psychology, in particular, therapists can easily fall into the 
trap of failing to undertake complex experiential techniques associated with cognitive 
restructuring due to the challenging nature of both their client group and the risk aversive 
context in which they work (see Gannon & Ward, 2014). Consequently, psychologists can 
find themselves developing relapse prevention plans replete with useful distractions and 
behavioral components (e.g., watching television, going to the gym, relaxation techniques) 
that do little to reformulate or correct the faulty belief system associated with offending 
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behavior (see also Wells, 1997). Thus, current methods of instigating cognitive change within 
offending populations appear to be missing key strategies necessary to convince offenders 
that alternative viewpoints and cognitions represent realistic or truthful alternatives. In the 
following sections I present the BE as an effective technique that is able to subsume many of 
the current techniques used to instigate cognitive change in offenders and in doing so 
facilitates cognitive change at both the propositional and implicational level (see Bennett-




The BE is associated with Cognitive Therapy which evolved from Beck’s work in 
depression (Beck, 1967; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).  Beck et al. proposed that 
cognitive patterns of negativity (e.g., personalizing external events to oneself in the absence 
of objective connection) functioned to consolidate and maintain faulty information 
processing associated with depression. In terms of assisting the depressed client, Beck et al. 
noted that the client’s negative cognitions were highly ubiquitous. Put simply, it seemed 
impossible for the therapist to simply talk the client ‘out’ of their negativity. Instead, Beck et 
al. proposed that a variety of techniques—such as Thought Records—could be used by the 
therapist to assist the client towards managing and more accurately appraising their negative 
cognitions. Amongst the techniques described by Beck et al. included BEs which he stated 
could gradually shift the client’s view regarding the soundness of their negative cognitive 
appraisals.  
Following the successful application of the cognitive model to depression, 
professionals began applying it to anxiety (e.g., Clark, 1986; Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Salkovskis, 1985; Wells, 1995; see Bennett-Levy et al., 2004). Here, BEs came to be cited as 
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a basic therapeutic technique for testing the reality of anxiety-provoking beliefs, and adapting 
affect (Wells, 1997). In his pioneering text examining anxiety, Wells (1997) describes how 
testing the reality underlying anxiety-provoking beliefs collaboratively and in-vivo with 
clients provides critical education for the generation of effective replacement beliefs. Wells 
(1997) also stressed the importance of using BEs early in therapy to speed up therapeutic 
change.  
 Professionals have now identified the important features of the BE as being 
experiential knowledge, decentering, emotional stimulation, the rehearsal of different 
behavior or plans, reflective learning, and the consolidation of new experiences in memory at 
varying levels (Bennett-Levy, 2003; Bennett-Levy et al., 2004; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 
2002). It is through these functional mechanisms that the BE appears to overcome the 
problem of intellectually knowing something to be true but not experiencing it as such 
(Bennett-Levy, 2003; Bennett-Levy et al., 2004).  
Evidence Base  
 The BE is a highly significant component of effective CBT (Bennett-Levy et al., 
2004; Clark, 1989; Farmer & Chapman, 2007; Harvey et al., 2004; Wells, 1997). For 
example, Westbrook et al. (2007) describe the BE as, “a CBT strategy which can be used to 
great effect in most if not all problems” (p. 129), Bennett-Levy (2003) notes that BEs are 
likely to be “more effective in actually giving alternative thoughts believability, and 
promoting therapeutic change.” (p. 263), and Beck (2011) concludes that “properly set up, 
behavioral experiments can be powerful agents of cognitive and emotional change (p. 200). 
In fact, Waller (2009) has suggested that therapy lacking the BE component may well have a 
reduced impact on clients. A number of studies have attempted to isolate the BE as a 
therapeutic technique and evaluate its effectiveness (Bennett-Levy, 2003; McManus et al., 
2012; Tang & Harvey, 2006, McMillan & Lee, 2010). All have reported superior BE results.  
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To illustrate, in one study (Bennett-Levy, 2003), experienced practitioners (n = 8; 6 
female) and students in cognitive therapy training (n = 19; 16 female) recruited in Australia 
were asked to implement and reflect upon their own use of thought records and BEs. 
Participants self-reported that—in comparison to thought recording—BEs were more 
influential in facilitating changes in both beliefs and behavior. General rather than specific 
examples of BE effectiveness were provided by Bennett-Levy. For example, one participant 
stated, “Everything else was great in terms of understanding, but behavioral experiments 
were actually the way I made a couple of changes” (p. 271). A key challenge identified for 
implementing the BE was anxiety. Participants reported that experiences of anxiety 
motivated them to avoid the BE. They also reported having difficulties identifying evidence 
to refute problematic thoughts once they were experiencing anxiety and felt that therapist 
support was crucial in order to implement the BE successfully. In a UK study examining 
community individuals diagnosed with sleep insomnia (N = 48; 27 female), Tang and Harvey 
(2006) found that those who engaged in a BE designed to highlight distorted sleep 
perceptions showed improved sleep onset latency estimates and significantly reduced anxiety 
and concern with sleep relative to non-BE sleep monitored individuals who diarized their 
sleep experiences. No qualitative descriptions of belief change or adaptation were examined 
in this study. Furthermore, the authors noted that this study was dissimilar to clinical BEs in 
the sense that participants were unaware of the purpose of the experiment. More recently, 
McManus et al. (2012) directly compared the effects of a single session of BE therapy versus 
thought record therapy amongst 91 non-clinical UK participants (49 female) experiencing 
subclinical irrational beliefs associated with hand washing (i.e., they indicated a 60% + belief 
that not washing their hands after using the toilet would result in them becoming ill). 
Participants in the BE condition were supported to test their belief through using the toilet 
and not washing their hands to see if they did, in fact, become unwell. Whilst both the BE 
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and thought record conditions were associated with an improvement in self reported beliefs 
(i.e., decreased quantitative conviction in the belief that “not washing your hands after going 
to the toilet will make you ill”) relative to the control condition, the BE instigated superior 
effects since improvements in the irrational belief were generalizable (e.g., they also 
positively influenced the belief that “Not washing your hands after going to the toilet will 
make others ill”) and occurred more rapidly. The authors of this study did not comment on 
any of the potential challenges of implementing the BE clinically. Finally, McMillan and Lee 
(2010) conducted a systematic review examining anxiety treatment studies that compared 
BEs with simple behavioral exposure techniques. Of the 14 best quality studies identified 
examining OCD (n = 1), panic (n = 3), social phobias (n = 8), or specific phobias (n = 2), 
McMillan and Lee’s review suggested that the BE was more effective than sole exposure 
techniques. However, the review authors note that their review was limited in the sense that 
they did not examine ‘grey’ studies.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the BE is now recommended as a key therapeutic technique in 
contemporary clinical psychology texts (Farmer & Chapman, 2007; Grant, Mills, Mulhern, & 
Short, 2004; Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk, and Clark, 1989; Westbrook, Kennerley, & Kirk, 
2007) and is used as a therapeutic tool aimed at altering beliefs and attitudes associated with 
a wide range of clinical problems including eating disorders (Corstorphine, 2006), diabetes-
related anxiety (Boyle, Allan, & Millar, 2004), insomnia (Ree & Harvey, 2004; Tang & 
Harvey, 2004), acquired brain injury (McGrath & King, 2004), Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (Clark, 1999; Mueller, Hackmann, & Croft, 2004), symptoms of psychosis (Close & 
Schuller, 2004), low self esteem (Fennell & Jenkins, 2004), and social phobia (Clark, 2001). 
Importantly, many of these clinical problems are highly likely to impede an offender’s ability 
to lead a pro social life or engage appropriately in treatment if left untreated. Thus,  
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application of the BE to these issues is likely to be particularly important within forensic 
settings.  
Types of BE 
Similarly to scientific theory testing, BEs take two preliminary forms: that of 
experimental orientated theory testing (i.e., manipulating factors to test specific theories) and 
that of discovery focused information gathering (i.e., exploratory surveys; Bennett-Levy et 
al., 2004; Westbrook et al., 2007). In experimental focused theory testing the aim is to 
develop robust predictions or hypotheses to be tested in relatively controlled circumstances 
(Bennett-Levy et al., 2004; Westbrook et al., 2007). For example, a client may be instructed 
to do something that they would not usually do to see if their predicted theory holds true 
(e.g., “If I stay in a room when I feel anxious I will stop breathing and collapse”). In some 
cases, however, clients may not hold clear hypotheses to test. Here, the client may need to 
‘discover’ or generate testable hypotheses. In discovery focused information gathering, the 
client is encouraged to gather evidence to generate possible alternative beliefs. Bennett-Levy 
et al. (2004) provide the example of an individual experiencing worthlessness who may be 
encouraged by their therapist to observe what happens when they socially interact in a more 
open manner. Following this, the individual may begin to develop both a clearer statement 
relating to their distressing belief as well as more adaptive alternative cognitions. Following 
discovery focused BEs therapist and client can then begin generating a series of robust and 
testable predictions.  
Professionals have noted one further notable dichotomy of BEs: that of active versus 
observational BEs (Rouf, Fennell, Westbrook, Cooper, & Bennett-Levy, 2004; Westbrook et 
al., 2007). In the former, the client is active in the BE through testing a prediction in order to 
discover new information. In the latter, the client uses observation to test a set of hypotheses 
(e.g., designing a survey to see what percentage of people feel ‘not listened to’ in social 
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situations) or in order to discover new information (e.g., watching a number of social 
interactions at a party to discover what happens). 
 
Use of BEs in Forensic Settings 
Given that the BE represents an empirically informed and commonly used technique 
for instilling cognitive change in clinical patients, it is surprising that this technique has not 
been explicitly adopted for widespread use in forensic settings (see Beech, Craig, & Browne, 
2009; Briggs & Kennington, 2006; Craig, Dixon, & Gannon, 2013; Hollin & Palmer, 2006; 
Ireland, 2009). In fact, very few programs appear to explicitly cite the BE as a meaningful 
therapeutic tool (see RESOLVE; National Offender Management Service, 2013 for one 
exception). A small number of forensic professionals have cited the BE as representing one 
potential technique for changing offense-supportive cognition (Baima & Guthrie, 2014; 
Beech, Bartels, & Dixon, 2013; Dean et al., 2007; Langton & Marshall, 2000). However, 
Langton and Marshall note that applying such a technique within the forensic domain can be 
challenging. Clearly, then, professionals require further detail on the BE technique, the 
benefits of such a technique, and exactly how such a technique should be implemented. 
Perhaps most surprisingly, in the most comprehensive and valuable texts to date examining 
the application of CBT principles to forensic clients and offending behavior programs more 
generally (Hollin & Palmer, 2006; Tafrate & Mitchell, 2014), no explicit references are made 
to the BE as a therapeutic tool.  
The Potential Value of the BE in Forensic Settings 
 Forensic psychology has been critiqued for failing to implement deeper level 
experiential techniques associated with behavioral psychology such as behavioral rehearsal 
and role play (Fernandez et al., 2006). The BE is one frequently overlooked technique that is 
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able to subsume both rational (i.e., propositional) and experiential (i.e., implicational) 
techniques to facilitate maximal belief and attitude change.  
 The BE enables psychologists to more readily facilitate believability to alternative 
non-problematic cognitions. This technique is likely to be of particular value in forensic 
settings where rational propositional approaches are likely to hold even less ‘change’ 
potential due to (1) a lack of motivation to engage with work that appears patronizing and 
‘school like’, (2) a lack of trust in psychology professionals’ suggestions and proposals of 
alternative cognition (Gannon & Ward, 2014), and (3) the low reported verbal reasoning 
abilities of forensic populations (Bellair, McNulty, & Piquero, 2014; Jones, 2013). 
Importantly, the BE provides the forensic psychologist with a meaningful opportunity to 
develop the client’s sense of autonomy as well as a collaborative and trusting therapeutic 
relationship; a factor often lacking within forensic contexts yet highly associated with 
effective therapy (Ackerman & Hilsenroth, 2003; Beech & Hamilton-Giachritis, 2005; Elvins 
& Green, 2008; Gannon & Ward, 2014; Marshall & Burton, 2010, Norcross, 2002, 2011). 
The BE also enables the forensic psychologist to engage in highly tailored evidence-based 
practice which has proved to be more effective in diminishing problematic behaviors—
including criminal behaviors—than less tailored practice (Barlow, 2011; Beutler et al., 2011; 
Boswell et al., 2011; Johansson et al., 2012; Marshall, 2009; Marshall & Serran, 2004; Serran 
et al., 2003).  
 
 
Planning and Undertaking BEs in Forensic Settings 
 Generally, the planning and commission of any BE comprises five key phases (Grant 
et al., 2004; Hawton et al., 1989; Wells, 1997; Westbrook et al., 2007). Across each of these 
stages, however, those working with forensic clients will need to consider the challenges and 
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problems faced when working in forensic environments (see Gannon & Ward, 2014). For 
example, it may not be possible to conduct BEs within the community unless the client in 
question resides in open conditions or holds some type of escorted leave privileges. In 
addition, it may take considerable creativity for psychologists to set up realistic BEs that do 
not breach forensic security.  
 In the first phase the client should be encouraged to engage in collaborative 
exploration and identification of the unhelpful cognition or overarching schema that requires 
investigation. As noted earlier, within forensic work, unhelpful cognitions are those deemed 
to be offense-supportive either because they are indicative of risk/criminogenic need (e.g., 
believing children desire or are unharmed by sex, viewing women as untrustworthy or 
malevolent, and tolerating or normalizing violence), or because they block the individual’s 
ability to lead a pro social life and/or impede treatment responsivity (e.g., views of self as 
worthless, or delusions associated with mental health problems). Thus, at this stage, it is 
critical that the psychologist holds a firm formulaic understanding of the client’s offending 
and of the range of cognitive factors directly or indirectly contributing to the offending 
behavior. Numerous resources are available to support psychologists in this task (e.g., Grant, 
Townend, Mills, Cockx, 2008; Sturmey & McMurran, 2011). What is crucial—in order to 
plan and undertake BEs—is that the psychologist and client hold a shared understanding of 
the range of cognitions facilitating and maintaining offending behavior as well as those 
potentially impeding treatment progression. Once this formulation has been developed, then 
client and psychologist can plan which cognitions should be immediately tested and in what 
order. In some cases, therapists will find that concentration of BE work on one key cognition 
will automatically soften or even alter other offense-supportive cognitions; making 
therapeutic efforts less intense as BEs proceed.  
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 In the second phase, the client should be supported to translate the unhelpful 
cognition(s) into a tangible notion to be tested. For example, the client who states that they 
‘just know’ that children are unharmed by sex with adults (a criminogenic belief) can be 
asked to describe in more detail how they have drawn this conclusion (e.g., “because I know 
that my victim is now grown up and has a family of his own”). Or, the client who experiences 
low self-esteem stating that they “just can’t” ask for their needs to be met by others—a 
cognition likely to impact upon factors such as relationship intimacy and treatment success—
may be aided to develop a more precise and testable set of beliefs (e.g., “If I ask for my needs 
to be met by others then they will reject me”). At this stage, the client should be asked to rate 
how much they believe the unhelpful cognition to be true using a 0-100% scale (0 = Not at 
all, 100 = Totally True). This element is crucial since it provides information concerning the 
severity of the unhelpful belief and enables any improvements made in therapy to be 
measured against this initial rating.  
In the third phase, the client should be encouraged to identify possible alternative 
beliefs or attitudes to be explored. For the client who views sex with children as “harmless” 
(“because I know that my victim is now grown up and has a family of his own”), an 
appropriate alternative attitude might be elicited through asking Socratic questions such as, 
“Can you think of a time when your life may have looked good to others but you were not 
feeling good inside?” or “Can you think of another way of looking at this?” Such questions 
may lead to the client themselves generating alternative attitudes such as, “It’s possible that 
sex can be harmful to children, but they hide it from others”. Despite careful questioning, 
however, some clients may require considerable support to generate possible alternative 
cognitions or may be unable to generate any. If a tangible and testable alternative belief is 
elicited, the client should be asked to rate how much they believe this alternative belief using 
the 0-100% scale outlined above. Typically, clients will identify very little conviction in the 
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alternative belief that they themselves have identified. However, this element is crucial since 
it provides baseline information regarding the client’s belief in alternative cognitions 
enabling any improvements made in therapy to be measured against this initial rating.  
At the fourth phase, the practitioner should share with the client the reasoning 
underpinning the BE. It is at this stage that client and practitioner collaborate to plan a BE 
through creating testable hypotheses directly linked to the unhelpful and alternative 
cognitions already identified (see Table 2 for examples). Although some key professionals 
may need to be informed of the planned BEs (e.g., those playing a key supportive role to the 
client such as personal officers or primary nurses), it is important that the planned BE and 
associated hypotheses are not openly communicated with others and are kept as naturalistic 
as possible. Highly staged BEs that have become common knowledge to others are unlikely 
to be effective since they can illicit unrealistic responses that impact negatively on both the 
learning experience and the therapeutic alliance.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The exact nature of the BE will depend upon the client themselves and how much 
they have been able to collaborate with the therapist (see Table 2). For example, a client who 
deals with their low self esteem through engaging in safety behaviors (i.e., not asking to 
switch shifts with someone on a voluntary work rosta even when they have an important 
event coming up in their life; Fennell & Jenkins, 2004) is likely to predict that if they do not 
engage in these safety behaviors then they will be rejected by others. Thus, a key requirement 
in planning any BE to test this prediction may involve the client searching for information 
regarding how other individuals like themselves might deal with a situation in which a 
voluntary work shift clashed with and important event (i.e., an active information gathering 
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BE) as well as being exposed to the feared situation whilst decreasing safety behaviors (i.e., a 
BE involving the offender asking a volunteer colleague or the work manager whether it is 
possible to switch shifts for an important event whilst recording reactions and behavioral 
responses to this request). In another example, a client who holds the attitude that violence is 
a usual and acceptable way of dealing with social problems may be unable to generate any 
alternative attitude even with sophisticated questioning and support. In this example, the 
client might be encouraged to identify a range of individuals whom they trust (e.g., family 
members, peers, professionals) and in collaboration with their therapist develop a survey to 
elicit each individual’s personal views on this topic. Of course, some responses (e.g., from 
family members or peers within the same antisocial network) may support the client’s offense 
supportive attitude. Consequently, it is important that therapist and client collaborate to 
discuss the best possible BE for testing out the client’s basic assumptions. In this case, for 
example, the client should be encouraged to gather information from a wider range of society 
in order to adequately test the breadth of their preexisting attitude. In essence, BEs should 
reflect best practice scientific hypothesis testing wherever possible, and clients should be 
encouraged to think carefully about the most objective and judicious BEs to test their 
belief(s). 
Finally, the end point of the sequence—stage 5—involves collaboratively evaluating 
the results of the BE and devising new BEs as required to test the unhelpful cognition or 
related unhelpful cognitions in alternative ways. It is critical, at this stage, to ensure that the 
client re-rates their belief in the unhelpful and alternative cognitions using the 0-100% scale. 
Shifts in these ratings may be used to evaluate the effectiveness of therapy and any residual 
unhelpful beliefs of notable rating should be reexamined so that new BEs can be developed 
and implemented (Wells, 1997).  
Problems and Concerns Undertaking BEs in Forensic Settings 
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Perhaps one of the biggest obstacles to implementing BEs within forensic settings is 
the fact that they take considerable clinical skill and time to set up and monitor correctly. As 
Gannon and Ward (2014) note, the modern day forensic psychologist faces significant 
pressures to treat huge numbers of forensic clients within highly security-focused 
environments via RNR-informed group programs. Individualized and creative therapy can be 
challenging to implement in security-focused establishments that attend almost exclusively to 
criminogenic need. Three key issues are evident. First, the collaboration and flexibility 
required to undertake effective BEs may well be misinterpreted within risk and security 
focused settings as collusion. Second, because security and risk are the key considerations 
within forensic contexts, any possible indicators of risk associated with undertaking an 
effective BE may be highlighted by forensic staff; preventing the BE being used as a long 
term psychological solution to risk. Third, some staff may fail to see the necessity for 
cognitions that appear non-criminogenic to be addressed as part of treatment. In all of these 
situations, the forensic psychologist should take the time to share their psychological 
formulation with multidisciplinary staff to ensure that the mechanisms of change, and the 
fundamental need for the proposed BE are understood by all. In particular, psychologists 
should be active—and take pride—in sharing and communicating flexible and effective 
psychological strategies with multidisciplinary staff. Particular emphasis, for example, should 
be placed upon the experiential and implicational processing aspect of the BE which is 
typically absent from many basic CBT techniques currently used to instigate cognitive 
change in forensic settings. There is ample room for BEs to be incorporated within group 
programs guided by RNR principles even when psychologists are experiencing an excessive 
workload. First, clients can be taught the key principles of the BE within group therapy and 
supported to identify a target belief and an associated BE that they can set up and test 
themselves. Alternatively, and ideally, psychologists can work with clients on a solely 
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individual basis or alongside group work to ensure appropriate set up, implementation, and 
debrief following a BE. Research (see Bennett-Levy, 2003) suggests that more, rather than 
less therapist support will enable anxious clients to appropriately follow through and analyze 
their BEs. Finally, BEs may be devised and implemented by forensic psychologists in 
training under appropriate supervision. Thus, although BEs require significant 
individualization in order for them to be effective (see Farmer & Chapman, 2008) they can 
and should be implemented within forensic settings. 
  A second universal problem found when implementing BEs is that, by their very 
nature, BEs will not always produce evidence that contradicts the unhelpful belief. When this 
is the case, the therapist should examine what can be taken as a learning point from the BE. 
For example, a client who claims to have ‘psychic powers’ may design a BE in which both he 
and his therapist leave the therapist room and write down three numbers. The client predicts 
that if he is indeed psychic then he will write down the same numbers as his therapist. When 
client and therapist show their numbers to each other they are exactly the same. In such a 
case it is of paramount importance that the therapist remains curious. The therapist might 
exclaim that they were not expecting this outcome and invite the client to look at all the 
possible explanations for the outcome (i.e., the three numbers written are the last three phone 
numbers of the ward, or psychic powers). Even in this example there are learning points to be 
gained resulting in the development of a more robust BE test of ‘psychic powers’. Finally, as 
Westbrook et al. (2007) notes, due to the explorative nature of BEs, and their use within real 
world settings, they can—and sometimes do—take unexpected negative turns (e.g., people 
react in a way that supports the unhelpful belief). In such cases, it is important that the 
therapist supports the client to examine the situation for the positive aspects so that the client 
does not experience the situation as disastrous (Westbrook et al., 2007).  
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 The above example outlines how the BE may be used spontaneously within 
therapeutic sessions. However, BEs should be used flexibly; as out of session work, or even 
as a more prolonged exercise (e.g., keeping a diary to record whether bad thoughts actually 
lead to bad things; Harvey et al., 2004). The therapist may also set up BEs outside of the 
office in which both client and therapist take part (e.g., a therapist feigning being lost for 
words with a female at a cash register so that their socially anxious client holding low self 
esteem can observe what happens). 
 Finally, it is important to design BEs that will not lead to client harm. It is also vital 
that therapists do not overlook opportunities to undertake BEs due to their own negative 
cognitions and anxieties (e.g., for fear of the client disengaging with therapy; Westbrook et 
al., 2007; Wells, 1997). Therapists should be mindful that effective BEs are likely to elicit 
uncomfortable experiences for the client (Westbrook et al., 2007) and that this component is 
key for the experiential learning process (Wells, 1997). Wells (1997) has also noted that 
therapists should be wary of falling into the trap of feeling that a client’s cognition is valid 
and unchangeable. For example, a forensic psychologist may struggle with a sense of 
hopelessness in attempting to tackle a client’s normalization of violence due to that client’s 
pervasive and extreme violent upbringing. This latter case, in particular, highlights the 
importance of regularly engaging with responsive and proactive supervision. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, I have examined the suite of contemporary techniques used by forensic 
psychologists to facilitate cognitive change in offending clients. I have argued that forensic 
psychologists use a range of both rational and experiential techniques imported from the 
general clinical psychology literature for promoting cognitive change. Surprisingly, however, 
although experiential methods such as role-play are being used in the forensic domain, I have 
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argued that there is one effective experiential technique—the BE—that is able to promote 
change at both the rational and experiential level and deserves much more attention. 
Currently, the BE is not explicitly adopted for widespread use in forensic settings (see Beech, 
Craig, & Browne, 2009; Briggs & Kennington, 2006; Craig, Dixon, & Gannon, 2013; Hollin 
& Palmer, 2006) and is not highlighted as an important therapeutic technique for instigating 
long-term cognitive change (see Tafrate & Mitchell, 2014). The BE is a technique used by 
mainstream clinical psychologists. It enables client and therapist to collaborate and genuinely 
test the client’s offense-supportive beliefs. These individually tailored experiments—when 
carefully designed—enable the offending client to experience adaptive substitute beliefs as 
more genuine cognitive alternatives. Consequently, although there are many experiential 
therapies that can be more widely used with offenders (e.g., imagery rescripting), the BE is 
most suitable and fitting for enabling psychologists to genuinely adapt problematic beliefs 
within the forensic context.  
There are a number of reasons why the BE is particularly suited for psychological 
work within the forensic context. First, the BE is based on the basic principles of scientific 
hypothesis testing and so is simple to implement. This technique can be used within both 
individual and group treatment (as long as there is some element of individual support work) 
and can be implemented by psychologists in training when supervised by a qualified forensic 
psychologist. Second, the BE is a collaborative technique that encourages client autonomy 
and client-therapist collaboration. Consequently, the BE is able to more readily facilitate the 
therapeutic alliance within a relationship that can often be fraught with mistrust (see Gannon 
& Ward, 2014). Third, the BE is a tool that can be applied to a whole host of problematic 
cognitions that may be viewed as being offense-supportive. The BE may be used to tackle 
cognitions indicating criminogenic need as well as those impeding the offending client’s 
ability to lead a prosocial life and/or engage and respond to treatment. In fact, the interested 
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reader will find many examples of effective BEs within general clinical psychology that may 
be adapted for tackling these latter types of cognitions (see Fennell & Jenkins, 2004; 
Flecknoe & Sanders, 2004; Grant et al., 2004). Fourth, clients do not need to hold a high 
level of verbal reasoning ability in order to engage with and understand the reasoning behind 
the BE. Finally, since BEs are tailor-made; they provide a clear opportunity for the forensic 
psychologist to engage in flexible and creative individualized treatment which is associated 
with increased treatment effectiveness (Barlow, 2011; Marshall, 2009; Marshall & Serran, 
2004). 
It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth for those of us working in forensic psychology 
that some of our methods of working with offending clients appear to lack the vigor and 
variation of those implemented by our more general clinical psychological colleagues. This is 
likely to reflect the evolving nature of a relatively new field of psychology that is playing 
catch up to the ‘big brother’ of mainstream clinical psychology. However, forensic 
psychologists are also subject to huge pressures to provide effective risk-reducing psychology 
to large numbers of clients whilst adhering to high levels of security (see Gannon & Ward, 
2014). Even within these constraints, however, the BE can and should hold an important 
place within forensic psychology. Forensic psychologists should consider valuable 
opportunities to undertake the BE with their clients, teach the skills required to implement 
good BEs to their students, and provide supervision to assist those in training to develop 
competencies in BE implementation. It appears that in policy-maker’s haste to provide 
psychological therapy to large numbers of offending clients, a fundamental problem has been 
overlooked. Offenders simply do not believe many of the intellectual challenges to their 
beliefs or the alternative substitute beliefs proposed by facilitators and peers. Put simply, 
clients need to experience for themselves situations in which their preexisting beliefs and 
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alternative beliefs are put to the test in order to bring about long lasting and pro-social 
cognitive change. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 31 
References 
Abel, G. G., Becker, J. V., & Cunningham-Rathner, J. (1984).  Complications, consent and 
cognitions in sex between children and adults.  International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry, 7, 189-103. doi: 10.1016/0160-2527(84)90008-6 
Ackerman, S. J., & Hilsenroth, M. J. (2003). A review of therapist characteristics and 
techniques positively impacting the therapeutic alliance. Clinical Psychology Review, 
23, 1-33. doi: 10.1016/s0272-7358(02)00146-0 
Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2010). The psychology of criminal conduct. (5th edition). 
Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.  
Apsche, J. A., Evile, M. M., & Murphy, C. (2004). An empirically based cognitive behavioral 
therapy for male juvenile sex offenders: A pilot study. The Behavior Analyst Today, 
5, 101-107.  doi: 10.1037/h0100136 
Baim, C., & Guthrie, L. (2014). Changing offending behavior: A handbook of practical 
exercises and photocopiable resources for promoting positive change. London: 
Jessica Kingsley.  
Barlow, D. H. (2011). A prolegomenon to clinical psychology: Two 40-year Odysseys. In D. 
H. Barlow (Ed), The oxford handbook of clinical psychology (pp.3-20). NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental and theoretical aspects. NY: Hoeber.  
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression. 
NY: Guildford Press. 
Beck, J. S. (2011). Cognitive behavior therapy: Basics and beyond (2nd ed). NY: Guilford. 
Beckett, R. C. (1994). Cognitive-behavioural treatment of sex offenders. In T. Morrisson, M. 
Erooga, & R. C. Beckett (Eds), Sexual offending against children: Assessment and 
treatment of male abusers. London: Routledge. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 32 
Beech, A. R., Bartels, R. M., & Dixon, L. (2013). Assessment and treatment of distorted 
schemas in sexual offenders. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 14, 54-66. doi: 
10.1177/1524838012463970 
Beech, A. R., Beckett, R. C., & Fisher, D. (1998). STEP 3: An evaluation of the prison sex 
offender treatment programme. London: Home Office. 
Beech, A. R., Craig, L. A., & Browne, K. D. (2009). Assessment and treatment of sex 
offenders: A handbook. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Beech, A. R., & Hamilton-Giachritis, C. E. (2005). Relationship between therapeutic climate 
and treatment outcomes in group-based sexual offender treatment program. Sexual 
Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 17, 127-140. doi: 
10.1177/107906320501700204 
Bellair, P. E., McNulty, T. L., & Piquero, A. R. (2014). Verbal ability and persistent 
offending: A race-specific test of Moffitt’s Theory. Justice Quarterly [Online First]. 
doi: 10.1080/07418825.2014.918166 
Bennett-Levy, J. (2003). Mechanisms of change in cognitive therapy: The case of automatic 
thought records and behavioural experiments. Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 31, 261-277. doi: 10.1017/S135246580300303 
Bennett-Levy, J., Westbrook, D., Fennell, M., Cooper, M. Rouf, K., & Hackmann, A. (2004). 
Behavioural experiments: historical and conceptual underpinnings. In J. Bennett-
Levy, G. Butler, M. Fennell, A. Hackmann, M. Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), 
Oxford guide to behavioral experiments in cognitive therapy (pp. 1-20). Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press. 
Beutler, L. E., Harwood, T. M., Michelson, A., Song, X., & Holman, J. (2011). 
Reactance/resistance level. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 67, 133-142.  doi: 
10.1002/jclp.20753 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 33 
Bishop, F. M. (2014).  An integrated REBT-Based approach to the treatment of addicted 
offenders. In R. C. Tafrate & D. Mitchell (Eds), Forensic CBT: A handbook for 
clinical practice (pp. 233-251). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Boswell, J. F., Sharpless, B. A., Greenberg, L. S., Heatherington, L., Huppert, J. D., Barber, 
J. P., …Castonguay, L. G. (2011). Schools of psychology and the beginnings of a 
scientific approach. In D. H. Barlow (Ed), The oxford handbook of clinical 
psychology (pp.98-127). NY: Oxford University Press. 
Boyle, S., Allan, C., & Millar, K. (2004). Cognitive-behavioural interventions in a patient 
with an anxiety disorder related to diabetes. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 
357-366. doi: 10.1016/j.brt.2003.11.006 
Briggs, D., & Kennington, R. (2006). Managing men who sexually abuse. London: Jessica 
Kingsley.  
Bumby, K. M. (1996). Assessing the cognitive distortions of child molesters and rapists: 
Developments and validation of the MOLEST and RAPE scales. Sexual Abuse:  A 
Journal of Research and Treatment, 8, 37-54. doi: 10.1007/bf02258015 
Clark, D. M. (1986). A cognitive model of panic. Behaviour, Research and Therapy, 24, 461-
470.  
Clark, D. M. (1989). Anxiety states: Panic and generalized anxiety. In K. Hawton, P. M. 
Salkovskis, J. Kirk, & D. M. Clark (Eds.), Cognitive behavior therapy for psychiatric 
problems: A practical guide. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Clark, D. M. (1999). Anxiety disorders: why they persist and how to treat them. Behaviour, 
Research and Therapy, 37, 5-27. doi: 10.1016/S0005-7967(99)00048-0 
Clark, D. M. (2001). A cognitive perspective on social phobia. In W. R. Crozier, & L. E. 
Alden (Eds), International handbook of social anxiety: Concepts, research and 
interventions relating to the self and shyness (pp. 405-430). NY: Wiley.  
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 34 
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. Heimberg, M. 
Liebowitz, D. A. Hope, & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: Diagnosis, 
assessment, and treatment. NY: Guilford.  
Clark, L., Tyler, N., & Gannon, T. A., & Kingham, M. (2014). Eyemovement desensitisation 
and reprocessing (EMDR) for offence related trauma in a mentally disordered sexual 
offender. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 20, 240-249. doi: 
10.1080/13552600.2013.822937 
Close, H., & Schuller, S. (2004). Psychotic symptoms. In J. Bennett-Levy, G. Butler, M. 
Fennell, A. Hackmann, M. Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), Oxford guide to 
behavioral experiments in cognitive therapy (pp. 245-263). Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press. 
Corstorphine, E. (2006). Cognitive-emotional-behavioural therapy for the eating disorders: 
Working with beliefs about emotions. European Eating Disorders Review, 14, 448-
461. doi: 10.1002/erv.747 
Craig, L., Dixon, L., & Gannon, T. A. (2013). What works in offender rehabilitation: An 
evidence based approach to assessment and treatment. Chichester, UK: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Cullen, A. E., Clarke, A. Y., Kuipers, E., Hodgins, S., Dean, K., & Fahy, T. (2012). A multi-
site randomised controlled trial of a cognitive skills programme for male mentally 
disordered offenders: social cognitive outcomes. Psychological Medicine, 42, 557-
569. doi: 10.1017/S0033291711001553 
Dean, C., Mann, R. E., & Milne, R. (2007). Changing child sexual abusers’ cognitions. In T. 
A. Gannon, T. Ward, A. R. Beech, & D. Fisher (Eds.), Aggressive offenders’ 
cognition: Theory, research and practice (pp. 117-134). Chichester, England: Wiley.  
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 35 
Drake, C., Ward, T., Nathan, P, & Lee, J. (2001). Challenging the cognitive distortions of 
child molesters: An implicit theory approach. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 7, 25-40. 
doi: 10.1080/13552600108416165 
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. 
American Psychologist, 49, 709-724. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.49.8.709 
Epstein, S. & Pacini, R. (1999). Some basic issues regarding dual-process theories from the 
perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), 
Dual-process theories in social psychology (pp. 462-482). NY: Guilford Press.  
Elvins, R., & Green, J. (2008). The conceptualization and measurement of therapeutic 
alliance: An empirical review. Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 1167-1187. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2008.04.002 
Farmer, R. F., & Chapman, A. L. (2008). Behavioral interventions in cognitive behavior 
therapy: Practical guidelines for putting theory into action. Washington, DC, APA. 
Fennell, M. J. V., & Jenkins, H. (2004). Low self esteem. In J. Bennett-Levy, G. Butler, M. 
Fennell, A. Hackmann, M. Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), Oxford guide to 
behavioral experiments in cognitive therapy (pp. 413-430). Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press. 
Fernandez, Y. M., Shingler, J., & Marshall, W. L. (2006). Putting “behavior” back into the 
cognitive-behavioral treatment of sexual offenders. In W. L. Marshall, Y. M. 
Fernandez, L. E. Marshall, & G. A. Serran (Eds.), Sexual offender treatment: 
Controversial issues (pp. 211-224). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to 
theory and tesearch. MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Flecknoe. P. & Sanders, D. (2004). Interpersonal difficulties. In J. Bennett-Levy, G. Butler, 
M. Fennell, A. Hackmann, M. Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), Oxford guide to 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 36 
behavioral experiments in cognitive therapy (pp. 393-409). Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press. 
Gannon, T. A., Alleyne, E., Butler, H. Danby, H., Kapoor, A., Lovell, T., … Ó Ciardha, C. 
(2015). Specialist group therapy for psychological factors associated with firesetting: 
Evidence of a treatment effect from a non-randomised trial with male prisoners. 
Manuscript submitted for publication.  
Gannon, T. A., King, T., Miles, H., Lockerbie, L., & Willis, G. (2011). Good lives sexual 
offender treatment for mentally disordered offenders. British Journal of Forensic 
Practice, 13, 153-168. doi: 10.1108/14636641111157805. 
Gannon, T. A., & Polaschek, D. L. L. (2006). Cognitive distortions in child molesters: A re-
examination of key theories and research. Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 1000-
1019. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2005.11.010. 
Gannon, T. A., & Ward, T. (2014). Where has all the psychology gone? A critical review of 
evidence-based psychological practice in correctional settings. Aggression and Violent 
Behavior, 19, 435-446. doi: 10.1016/j.avb.2014.06.006 
Gannon, T. A., & Wood, J. L. (2007). Child sexual abuse-related cognition: Current research. 
In Gannon, T. A., Ward, T., Beech, A. R., & Fisher, D. (Eds), Aggressive offenders’ 
cognition: Theory research and practice (pp. 71-89). Chichester, UK: John Wiley.  
Gilchrist, E. (1999). Implicit thinking about implicit theories in intimate partner violence. 
Psychology, Crime and Law, 15, 131-145. doi: 10.1080/10683160802190863 
Graham, I.-J., & Van Dieten, M. V. (1999). Counter point: A program for attitude and 
behaviour change. Canada: John Howard Society of Ottawa-Carleton and 
Correctional Service of Canada.  
Grant, A., Mills, J., Mulhern, R., & Short, N. (2004). Cognitive behavioural therapy in 
mental health care. London: Sage.  
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 37 
Grant, A., Townend, M., Mills, J., & Cockx, A. (2008). Assessment and case formulation in 
cognitive behavioral therapy. London: Sage. 
Gray, N.S., Carman, N.G., Rogers, P., MacCulloch, M.J., Hayward, P. & Snowden, R.J. (2003). 
Post-traumatic stress disorder caused in mentally disordered offenders by the committing 
of a serious violent or sexual assault.  The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 
14, 27-43.  doi: 10.1080/1478994031000074289 
Hall, G. C. (1995). Sex offender recidivism revisited: A meta-analysis of recent treatment 
studies. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 63, 802-809. doi: 
10.1037/0022-006x63.5.802 
Hanson, R. K. (2006). Stability and change: dynamic risk factors for sexual offenders. In W. 
L. Marshall, Y. M. Fernandez, L. E. Marshall, & G. A. Serran (Eds.), Sexual offender 
treatment: Controversial issues (pp. 17-32). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Hanson, R. K., Gordon, A., Harris, A. J. R., Marques, J. K., Murphy, W., Quinsey, V. L., & 
Seto, M. C. (2002). First report of the Collaborative Outcome Project on the 
effectiveness of psychological treatment for sex offenders. Sexual Abuse: A Journal 
of Research and Treatment, 14, 159-194. doi: 10.1177/107906320201400207 
Hanson, R. K., & Harris, A. J. R. (2000). Where should we intervene? Dynamic predictors of 
sexual offense recidivism. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 27, 6-35. doi: 
10.1177/0093854800027001002 
Hanson, R. K., & Morton-Bourgon, K. E. (2005). The characteristics of persistent sexual 
offenders: A meta-analysis of recidivism studies. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 73, 1154-1163. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x73.6.1154 
Hanson, R. K., & Scott, H. (1995). Assessing perspective-taking among sexual offenders, 
nonsexual criminals, and nonoffenders. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and 
Treatment, 7, 259-277. doi: 10.1177/107906329500700403 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 38 
Harvey, A., Watkins, E., Mansell, W., & Shafran, R. (2004). Cognitive behavioural 
processes across psychological disorders: A transdiagnostic approach to research 
and treatment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hawton, K., Salkovskis, P. M., Kirk, J., & Clark, D. M. (1989). Cognitive behavior therapy 
for psychiatric problems: A practical guide. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Helmus, L., Hanson, R. K., Babchishin, K. M., & Mann, R. E. (2013). Attitudes supportive of 
sexual offending predict recidivism: A meta-analysis. Trauma, Violence, and Abuse, 
14, 34-53. doi:10.1177/1524838012462244 
Hollin, C. R., & Palmer, E. J. (Eds.) (2006). Offending behaviour programmes: Development, 
application, and controversies. Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons. 
Ireland, J. L. (2009). Treatment approaches for violence and aggression: Essential content 
components. In J. L. Ireland, C. A. Ireland, & P. Birch (Eds.), Violent and sexual 
offenders: Assessment, treatment and management (pp. 153-178). Devon: Willan 
Johansson, R., Sjöberg, E., Sjöberg, M., Johnsson, E., Carlbring, P., Andersson, T., … 
Andersson, G. (2012).Tailored vs. Standardized internet-based cognitive behavior 
therapy for depression and comorbid symptoms: A randomised control trial. PloS 
ONE, 7 (5). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036905 
Jones, S. (2013). Criminology (5th ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kennedy, S. M. (2000). Treatment responsivity: Reducing recidivism by enhancing treatment 
effectiveness. Forum on Corrections Research, 12, 19-23. 
Keulen-de Vos, M., Bernstein, D. P., & Arntz, A. (2014). Schema therapy for aggressive 
offenders with personality disorders. In R. C. Tafrate & D. Mitchell (Eds), Forensic 
CBT: A handbook for clinical practice (pp. 66-83). Chichester, England: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 39 
Kroner, D. G., & Morgan, R. D. (2014). An overview of strategies for the assessment and 
treatment of criminal thinking. In R. C. Tafrate & D. Mitchell (Eds), Forensic CBT: A 
handbook for clinical practice (pp. 87-103). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Landenberger, N. A., & Lipsey, M. W. (2005). The positive effects of cognitive-behavioral 
programs for offenders: A meta-analysis of factors associated with effective 
treatment. Journal of al Criminology, 1, 451-476. doi: 10.1007/s11292-005-3541-7 
Langton, C. M. (2007). Rape-related cognition: Current research. In T. A. Gannon, T. Ward, 
A. R. Beech, and D. Fisher (Eds.), Aggressive offenders’ cognition: Theory, research 
and practice (pp. 91-116). Chichester, England: John Wiley and Sons. 
Langton, C. M., & Marshall, W. L. (2000). The role of cognitive distortions in relapse 
prevention programs. In D. R. Laws, S. M. Hudson, & T. Ward (Eds.), Remaking 
relapse prevention with sex offenders: A source book (pp. 167-186). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Latessa, E. J., Listwan, S. J., & Koetzle, D. (2014). What works (and doesn’t) in reducing 
recidivism. MA: Anderson. 
Looman, J., & Abracen, J. (2013). The risk need responsivity model of offender 
rehabilitation: Is there really a need for a paradigm shift? International Journal of 
Behavioral Consultation and Therapy, 8, 30-36. doi: 10.1037/h0100980 
Mann, R. E., Daniels, M., & Marshall, W. L. (2002). The use of role-plays in developing 
empathy. In Y. Fernandez (Ed.), In their shoes: Examining the issue of empathy and 
its place in the treatment of offenders (pp. 132-156). OK, Wood ‘N’ Barnes.  
Mann, R. E., Hanson, R.K. & Thornton, D. (2010). Assessing risk for sexual recidivism: 
Some proposals on the nature of psychologically meaningful risk factors. Sexual 
Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 22, 191-217. doi: 
10.1177/1079063210366039 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 40 
Mann, R. E., & Shingler, J. (2006). Schema driven cognition in sexual offenders: Theory, 
assessment, and treatment. In W. L. Marshall, Y. M. Fernandez, L. E. Marshall, & G. 
A. Serran (Eds.), Sexual offender treatment: Controversial issues (pp. 173-185). 
Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Marques, J. K., Nelson, C., Alarcon, J.-M., & Day, D. M. (2000). Preventing relapse in sex 
offenders: What we learned from SOTEP’s experimental treatment program. In D. R. 
Laws, S. M. Hudson, & T. Ward (Eds.), Remaking relapse prevention with sex 
offenders: A sourcebook (pp. 321-340). CA: Sage. 
Marshall, W. L. (2009). Manualization: A blessing or a curse? Journal of Sexual Aggression, 
15, 109-120. 
Marshall, W. L., & Burton, D. L. (2010). The importance of group processes in offender 
treatment. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 15, 141-149.  
Marshall, W. L., Marshall, L. E., Serran, G. A., & Fernandez, Y. M. (1999). Treating sexual 
offenders: An integrated approach. London: Routledge.  
Marshall, W. L., Marshall, L. E., Serran, G. A., & O’Brien, M. D. (2011). Rehabilitating 
sexual offenders: A strength-based approach. WA: APA. 
Marshall, W. L., & Serran, G. A. (2004). The role of the therapist in offender treatment. 
Psychology, Crime & Law, 10, 309-320. 
Maruna, S. (2001). Making good: How ex convicts reform and rebuild their lives. WA: APA. 
Maruna, S., & Copes, H. (2005). What have we learned in five decades of neutralization 
research? Crime and Justice, 32, 221-320. 
Maruna, S., & Mann, R. E. (2006). A fundamental attribution error? Rethinking cognitive 
distortions. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 11, 155-177. doi: 
10.1348/135532506X114608 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 41 
McGrath, R. J., Cumming, G. F., Burchard, B. L., Seoli, S. & Ellerby, L. (2009). Current 
practices and emerging trends in sexual abuser management: The Safer Society 2009 
North American survey. VT: Safer Society. Retrieved from 
http://www.safersociety.org/downloadables/WP141-
Current_Practices_Emerging_Trends.pdapa  
McGrath, J., & King, N. (2004). Acquired brain injury. In J. Bennett-Levy, G. Butler, M. 
Fennell, A. Hackmann, M. Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), Oxford guide to 
behavioral s in cognitive therapy (pp. 331-348). Oxford, England: Oxford University 
Press. 
McManus, F., Van Doon, K., & Yiend, J. (2012). Examining the effects of thought records 
and behavioral experiments in instigating belief change. Journal of Behavior Therapy 
and al Psychiatry, 43, 540-547. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2011.07.003.  
McMillan, D., & Lee, R. (2010). A systematic review of behavioral s vs. exposure alone in 
the treatment of anxiety disorders: A case of exposure while wearing the emperor’s 
new clothes? Clinical Psychology Review, 30, 467-478. doi: 
10.1016/j.cpr.2010.01.003. 
Mills, J. F., Kroner, D. G., & Hemmati, T. (2004). The Measure of Criminal Attitudes and 
Associates (MCAA). The prediction of general and violent recidivism. Criminal 
Justice and Behavior, 31, 717-733. doi: 10.1177/0093854804268755 
Morin, J. W., & Levenson, J. S. (2002). Road to freedom: A comprehensive competency-
based workbook for sexual offenders in treatment. OK: Wood ‘N’ Barnes. 
Mueller, M., Hackmann, A., & Croft, A. (2004). Post-traumatic stress disorder. In J. Bennett-
Levy, G. Butler, M. Fennell, A. Hackmann, M. Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), 
Oxford guide to behavioral s in cognitive therapy (pp. 183-201). Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 42 
Murphy, W. D. (1990). Assessment and modification of cognitive distortions in sex 
offenders.  In W. L. Marshall, D. R. Laws, & Barbaree (Eds.), Handbook of sexual 
assault: Issues, theories, and treatment of the offender (pp. 331-342). NY: Plenum. 
National Offender Management Service (2013). RESOLVE Programme. Unpublished 
manual. Ministry of Justice.  
Norcross, J. C. (2002). Empirically supported therapy relationships. In J. C. Norcross (Ed.), 
Psychotherapy relationships that work: Therapist contributions and responsiveness to 
patients (pp. 3-16). NY: Oxford University Press.  
Norcross, J. C. (2011). (Ed.), Psychotherapy relationships that work: Therapist contributions 
and responsiveness to patients. NY: Oxford University Press.  
Ó Ciardha, C., & Gannon, T. A. (2010). The cognitive distortions of child molesters are in 
need of treatment. Journal of Sexual Aggression, 17, 130-141. doi: 
10.1080/13552600.2011.580573. 
Overholser, J. C. (1993). Elements of the Socratic method: 1. Systematic questioning. 
Psychotherapy, 30, 67-74. 
Pearson, F. S., Lipton, D. S., Cleland, C. M., & Yee, D. S. (2002). The effects of 
behavioral/cognitive-behavioral programs on recidivism. Crime and Delinquency, 48, 
476-496. doi: 10.1177/001112870204800306 
Pfäfflin, F.,  Böhmer, M., Cornehl, S., & Mergenthaler, E. (2005). What happens in therapy 
with sexual offenders? A model of process research. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of 
Research and Treatment, 17, 141-151. doi: 10.1007/s11194-005-4601-2 
Polaschek, D. L. L., Calvert, S., & Gannon, T. A. (2009). Linking violent thinking. Implicit 
theory-based research with violent offenders. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 24, 
75-96. doi: 10.1177/0886260508315781. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 43 
Polaschek, D. L. L., & Gannon, T. A. (2004). The implicit theories of rapists: What convicted 
offenders tell us. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 16, 299-315.  
doi: 10.1023/B:SEBU.0000043325.94302.40. 
Porporino, F. J. (2010). Brining sense and sensitivity to corrections: From programmes to 
‘fix’ offenders to services to support desistence. In J. Brayford, F. Cowe, & J. Deering 
(Eds.), What else works? Creative work with offenders. Devon: Willan.  
Rafaeli, E., Bernstein, D. P., & Young, J. E. (2011). Schema therapy. The CBT distinctive 
features series. NY: Routledge.  
Ree, M., & Harvey, A. (2004). Insomnia. In J. Bennett-Levy, G. Butler, M. Fennell, A. 
Hackmann, M. Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), Oxford guide to behavioral s in 
cognitive therapy (pp. 287-305). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Ross, R. R., & Ross, R. D. (1995). The R&R programme. In R. R. Ross, & R. D. Ross (Eds.), 
Thinking straight: The reasoning and rehabilitation programme for delinquency 
prevention and offender rehabilitation (pp. 83- 20). Ottawa: AIR Training and 
Publications. 
Rouf, K., Fennell, M., Westbrook, D., Cooper, M., & Bennett-Levy, J. (2004). Devising 
effective behavioural s. In J. Bennett-Levy, G. Butler, M. Fennell, A. Hackmann, M. 
Mueller, & D. Westbrook (Eds), Oxford guide to behavioral s in cognitive therapy 
(pp. 21-58). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Salkovskis, P. M. (1985). Obsessional-compulsive problems: A cognitive behavioural 
analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23, 571-583. 
Seeler, L., Freeman, A., DiGiuseppe, R., & Mitchell, D. (2014). Traditional Cognitive-
Behavioral Therapy models for antisocial patterns. In R. C. Tafrate & D. Mitchell 
(Eds), Forensic CBT: A handbook for clinical practice (pp. 15-42). Chichester, 
England: Wiley-Blackwell. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 44 
Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., & Teasdale, J. T. (2002). Mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy for depression: A new approach to preventing relapse. NY: Guilford. 
Serran, G. A., Fernandez, Y. M., Marshall, W. L., & Mann, R. E. (2003). Process issues in 
treatment: Applications to sexual offender programs. Professional Psychology: 
Research and Practice, 34, 368-374.  
Simourd, D. J. (1997). The Criminal Sentiments Scale-Modified and Pride in Delinquency 
Scale: Psychometric properties and construct validity of two measures of criminal 
attitudes. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 24, 52-70. doi: 
10.1177/0093854897024001004. 
Simourd, D. J., & Van De Ven, J. Assessment of criminal attitudes: Criterion-related validity 
of the Criminal Sentiments Scale-Modified and Pride in Delinquency Scale. Criminal 
Justice and Behavior, 26, 90-106. doi: 10.1177/0093854899026001005 
Simourd, D. J., & Olver, M. E. (2002). The future of criminal attitudes research and practice. 
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 29, 427-446. doi: 10.1177/0093854802029004005 
Stinson, J. D., & Becker, J. V. (2013). Treating sex offenders: An evidence-based manual. 
NY: Guilford. 
Sturmey, P., & McMurran, M. (2011). Forensic case formulation. Chichester, England: 
Wiley-Blackwell.  
Tafrate, R. C., & Mitchell, D. (Eds), Forensic CBT: A handbook for clinical practice. 
Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Tang, N. K. Y., & Harvey, A. G. (2004). Correcting distorted perception of sleep in 
insomnia: A novel behavioural ? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42, 27-39. doi: 
10.1016/S0005-7967(03)00068-8 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 45 
Teasdale, J. D. (1997). The relationship between cognition and emotion: The mind-in-place 
in mood disorders. In D. M. Clark & C. G. Fairburn (Eds.), The science and practice 
of cognitive behavior therapy (pp. 67-93). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Teasdale, J. D., & Barnard, P. J. (1993). Affect, cognition and change: Remodelling 
depressive thought. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum.  
Thornton, D. (2002) Constructing and testing a framework for dynamic risk assessment. 
Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 14, 139–153. Doi: 
10.1177/107906320201400205 
Tong, L. S. J., & Farrington, D. P. (2008). Effectiveness of reasoning and rehabilitation in 
reducing reoffending. Psicothema, 20, 20-28. doi: 10.1080/10683160512331316253 
Valliant, P. M., & Antonowicz, D. M. (1991). Cognitive behaviour therapy and social skills 
training improves personality and cognition in incarcerated offenders.  Psychological 
Reports, 68, 27-33. doi: 10.2466/pr0.1991.68.1.27   
Waller, G. (2009). Evidence-based treatment and therapist drift. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 47, 119-127. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2008.10.018 
Walters, G. D. (2014). Applying CBT to the criminal thought process. In R. C. Tafrate &  D. 
Mitchell (Eds), Forensic CBT: A handbook for clinical practice (pp. 104-121). 
Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Ward, T. (2000).  Sexual offenders’ cognitive distortions as implicit theories.  Aggression 
and Violent Behavior, 5, 491-507.  
Ward, T., Collie, R. M., & Bourke, P. (2009). Models of offender rehabilitation: The good 
lives model and the risk-need-responsivity model. In A. R. Beech, L. A. Craig, and K. 
D. Browne (Eds.), Assessment and treatment of sex offenders: A handbook (pp. 293-
310). Chichester, England: Wiley-Blackwell.  
Ward, T., & Gannon, T. A. (2006). Rehabilitation, etiology, and self-regulation: The 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 46 
comprehensive good lives model of treatment for sexual offenders. Aggression and 
Violent Behavior, 11, 77-94. doi:10.1016/j.avb.2005.06.001. 
Ward, T., & Keenan, T. (1999).  Child molesters’ implicit theories.  Journal of Interpersonal 
Violence, 14, 821-838. 
Ware, J. & Bright, D. (2008). Evolution of a treatment program: Recent changes to NSW 
Custody Based Intensive Treatment (CUBIT). Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law.15, 
340-349. doi: 10.1080/13218710802014543 
Watson, R. J., & Stermac, L. E. (1994). Cognitive group counselling for sexual offenders. 
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 38 (3), 
259-270. doi: 10.1177/0306624X9403800308 
Webster, S. D., Bowers, L. E., Mann, R. E., & Marhsall, W. L. (2005). Developing empathy 
in sex offenders: the value of offence re-enactments. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of 
Research and Treatment, 17, 63-77. Doi: 10.1177/107906320501700107 
Wells, A. (1995). Meta-cognition and worry: A cognitive model of generalized anxiety 
disorder. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23, 301-320.  
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: A practice manual and conceptual 
guide. Chichester, England: Wiley.  
Westbrook, D., Kennerley, H., & Kirk, J. (2007). An introduction to cognitive behavior 
therapy: Skills and applications. London: Sage.  
Willis, G., Yates, P., Gannon, T. A., & Ward, T. (2013). How to integrate the Good Lives 
Model into treatment programs for sexual offending: An introduction and overview. 
Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 25, 143-142. doi: 10. 
1177/1079063212452618. 
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 47 
Yates, P. M. (2009). Is sexual offender denial related to sex offence risk and recidivism? A 
review and treatment implications. Psychology, Crime and Law, 15, 183-199. Doi: 
10.1080/10683160802190905 
Yessine, A.K., & Kroner, D.G. (2004). Altering antisocial attitudes among federal male 
offenders on release: A preliminary analysis of the counter-point community program 
(R-152). Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada.  
Young, J. E., Klosko, J. S., & Weishaar, M. E. (2003). Schema therapy: A pracitioner’s 
guide. NY: Guilford.  
 
  
BEHAVIORAL EXPERIMENT 48 
Table 1.  
Examples of Good Life/Responsivity Cognition Categories to be Targeted in Treatment 
Self Esteem 
    “I am a failure at everything”,   
    “I am not worthy of being loved”,   
    “I am disliked by other people”,    
    “There is something wrong with my physical appearance” 
Trust 
    “Psychologists twist and exploit everything I say” 
    “Professionals always let you down” 
Trauma  
     “I will lose control if I talk about my distressing experience” 
     “I will go mad if I experience a flashback” 
Mental Health 
      Social Anxiety (e.g., “Others will ridicule me if I blush”) 
      Depression (e.g., “I can’t see any point to life”) 
      Believing thoughts direct actions (e.g., “Thinking about offending makes me     
 offend”)  
 Psychosis (e.g., My thoughts are being broadcast to others, “Other 
 People are putting thoughts into my head”, “I can read other people’s minds,  “I 
 must obey the voices that I hear”) 
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Table 2 
Examples of BEs Applied to Forensic Cognition 
Case 1: Cognitions Supporting Child Sexual Abuse 
Background: Adrian was a 38-year-old detained in hospital with a diagnosis of 
Schizoaffective disorder. His index offense involved him sexually assaulting a prepubescent 
child acquaintance in public toilets. During his sexual offender treatment group he 
consistently stated that young children “knew enough about sex to make their own decisions” 
and became angry when this perspective was challenged by other group members.  
Offense Supportive Cognition: Young children are knowledgeable and well informed about 
sex (belief conviction = 100%). 
Alternative Cognition(s): Adrian was unable to generate or consider any alternative 
cognitions.  
Experiment: Adrian’s facilitator set up an exploratory survey. She found an optical illusion 
(Message d’Amour des Dauphins, Sandro Del Prete, 1987; pictured below) depicting both 
dolphins and a couple posing erotically.  
Adrian’s facilitator prepared him for the experiment by showing 
him the optical illusion. At first, Adrian could only see the 
erotic pose and his facilitator had to point out the dolphins in the 
picture. Adrian predicted that prepubescent children would also 
see the sexual pose first due to their sexual awareness. His 
facilitator asked five of her colleague’s prepubescent children to 
look at the picture and audio recorded their responses. 
Outcome: All five of the children saw dolphins in the picture 
first. Only one child also noticed the couple posing erotically. 
Adrian was visibly surprised by the outcome. He stated that it 
had made him think further about how children view their 
world. This enabled Adrian to collaborate with his facilitator on more experiments to test the 
validity of his belief about children’s sexual knowledge.  Adrian reduced his original belief 
rating to 75% 
Case 2: Cognitions Supporting Sexual Assault of Adults 
Background: Geoffrey was a 50-year-old male detained in hospital with a diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia. His index offenses consisted of two counts of sexual assault: one against an 
acquaintance and one against a hospital staff member. During individualized treatment for his 
offending he angrily stated that he could “never trust a woman” enough to have an intimate 
relationship. He recalled one particularly painful experience during his early 20s when—
without warning—a woman he had been living with left him for another man and cleared out 
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1 In this case, it was important to ensure items that could breech security were not left lying around on 
the Wing. 
their joint bank account. 
Offense Supportive Cognition: Women cannot ever be trusted. They will always let you 
down (belief conviction = 95%). 
Alternative Cognition(s): Geoffrey was able to generate an alternative perspective (i.e., 
“There might be some women you can trust”) but rated this belief with little conviction 
(15%). 
Experiment: Geoffrey predicted that anyone who had been badly treated by a woman in the 
past would also believe women to be untrustworthy. Geoffrey’s facilitator collaborated with 
Geoffrey and devised a short exploratory survey that could be given to five of Geoffrey’s 
male heterosexual friends in the community and five male heterosexual hospital staff. The 
survey asked respondents whether they had ever been significantly ‘let down’ by a woman, 
how this had affected them, whether they were currently in a relationship with a woman, and 
how they currently viewed women. 
Outcome: The results were varied illustrating that men had very different experiences and 
thoughts about women. Importantly, however, a sizeable proportion of men could recall a 
negative experience of having been significantly ‘let down’ by a woman but had viewed this 
as a ‘one off’ and had gone on to develop trusting and respectful relationships with women. 
Geoffrey appeared to think deeply about how other people had ‘moved on’ from damaging 
experiences with women. He stated that he believed he had not coped well with the situation 
and had allowed this one experience to taint his view of all other women. Geoffrey re-rated 
his original belief as 60% and his alternative belief as 40%. 
Case 3: Cognitions Supporting General Offending 
Background: Jim was a 27-year-old serving a short term prison sentence for theft. Jim had 
been convicted of numerous theft offenses previously. Jim held firm beliefs about the 
antisocial nature of the world around him. He stated that he saw no point in changing his own 
criminal lifestyle or beliefs since those around him were “all the same”. 
Offense Supportive Cognition: Everyone is ‘up to no good’. If you turn your back and leave 
anything unguarded people will steal – it’s human nature (belief conviction = 90%). 
Alternative Cognition: It is possible that there are some people out there who will not take 
advantage of me leaving something unguarded (belief conviction = 10%). 
Experiment: Over a period of two weeks, Jim and his therapist set up a series of experiments 
on his prison wing in which items that looked appealing but were innocuous1—such as an 
empty leather pouch—were left unattended at various places on the wing.  
Outcome: Interestingly, over a period of two weeks, the majority of items left on the wing 
were either handed into the Wing office by prisoners or prison staff, or went unnoticed. A 
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small percentage ‘went missing’. On one occasion, a fellow prisoner went up to Jim with his 
‘leather pouch’ warning him to be ‘more careful’ as he had left it on the pool table. Jim stated 
that he was surprised that such a small amount of items had seemingly been taken. He 
reflected that even in prison, people were less antisocial than he had originally thought. Jim 
re-rated his original belief as 40% and his alternative belief as 60%. 
Case 4: Cognitions Blocking a Good Life/Treatment Responsivity 
Background: Phil was a 38-year-old serving a short-term sentence for assault. Phil had never 
received a prison sentence before and was attending a general cognitive skills group. He 
valued intimacy with females in the community highly and began to become preoccupied 
with beliefs that his sexual potency was diminishing in prison since he was not experiencing 
regular erections in his ‘shared cell’.  Phil was so preoccupied with these beliefs that they 
dominated any conversation that he had with his facilitator and he appeared distracted in 
group sessions. 
Cognition Blocking Good Life/Treatment Responsivity: Being in prison is affecting my 
sexual potency. If this carries on I will be totally impotent by the time I am released (belief 
conviction = 85%). 
Alternative Cognition: Perhaps there is nothing wrong with my sexual potency and I am just 
feeling more anxious than usual as I am in prison and sharing a cell (belief conviction = 
15%).  
Experiment: Phil was due to be moving to his own cell in the near future. Before and after 
the cell move, Phil was encouraged to keep a log of spontaneous erections experienced. Phil 
predicted that if his potency had been irretrievably affected by prison then he would 
experience no difference in erections experienced after moving to his own cell. Once alone in 
a cell, Phil was also asked to conduct a masturbatory experiment. As part of this experiment, 
Phil was asked to masturbate every day over the period of a week and to rate his erection 
strength (0 = flaccid, 10 = extremely hard) and time to climax. Phil predicted that if his 
potency was damaged for good then he would not be able to achieve a firm erection or 
masturbate effectively.  
Outcome: Once Phil moved cells, he reported that his spontaneous erections did not increase. 
Both Phil and his facilitator examined the possible reasons for this (i.e., anxiety or a long 
term decrease in sexual potency) and then instigated the masturbatory experiment. Phil 
reported very satisfactory erections and time to masturbation once he had been directed to 
engage in masturbatory homework. From this, Phil concluded that his anxiety at being in 
prison had dampened his spontaneous erections but that once he put his mind to it his potency 
was still very much present.  Jim re-rated his original belief as 30% and his alternative belief 
as 70%. 
Case 5: Cognitions Blocking a Good Life/Treatment Responsivity 
Background: Tim was a 57-year-old serving a medium term prison sentence for arson. He 




was keen to undertake a new group examining firesetting. However, at the first group, he left 
the room stating that he could not sit in the room alongside so many people due to 
claustrophobia.  
Cognition Blocking Good Life/Treatment Responsivity: If I sit in that treatment room for 
an hour with all of those people in it I will collapse due to a lack of oxygen (belief conviction 
= 85%). 
Alternative Cognition: If I sit in the treatment room for an hour with lots of other people I 
may experience a panic attack and ‘feel’ like I am running out of oxygen but I will not 
collapse (belief conviction = 40%).  
Experiment: Tim was a very engaged individual who was keen to ensure that his fears did 
not stop him from undertaking the group. He had battled with his experience of 
claustrophobia for some time and was willing to test himself fully. Tim agreed to sit in the 
treatment room outside of group time with the room full of psychology assistants. Tim stated 
that he would try and stay in the room for the full hour while the team talked about 
psychology programs available at the prison. He was asked to rate his anxiety every ten 
minutes.  
Outcome: Tim found the situation extremely anxiety provoking and rated himself as having 
high levels of anxiety in the first 20 minutes of the session. However, he was able to stay in 
the room for the full hour and noted that his anxiety decreased over time. He reflected that he 
did not collapse or faint due to a lack of oxygen. Tim stated that he felt more convinced of his 
alternative belief after ‘sitting it out’.  Tim re-rated his original belief as 40% and his 
alternative belief as 60%. 
